The paper studies endogenous world balanced growth equilibria in which national learning productivity differentials govern relative per capita products. Learning productivities depend on the national share of world specialized-goods production, national and world scale, and familiarity with the foreign economy. Familiarity indexes the extent to which imported specialized goods enhance learning productivity. We find that mutual familiarization causes per capita products to converge. Unfamiliar economies diverge substantially and persistently. Unilateral familiarization of a less-developed country (LDC) with the leading economy causes the LDC to catch up to, and even overtake, the leader. JEL Nos. F12, F43, N1, O11.
development. We think that by modeling sweeping observations from economic history we can uncover clues about economic development not as apparent in data from specific countries and shorter time periods. Our model embodies three basic ideas. First, there must be a form of localized increasing returns that induces geographically concentrated industrialization. Such localized elements are the basis for divergence in the model. Second, it must be possible for know-how developed in the industrial leaders to flow to the followers. This creates the potential for convergence. Finally, the model turns crucially on the idea that there is an important form of jointness in production--one analogous to the jointness in production emphasized in learning by doing models. Local production of certain goods enhances local production of human capital.
Many models that have looked at learning by doing alone predict divergence.
Early leaders never lose their advantage. The combination of all three elements in our model shows how this prediction can go wrong. This possibility comes from the mix of localized elements in learning and the international flow of knowledge. These are mediated by a combination of trade in goods and a process that we summarize with a "familiarity" parameter.
Growth rates converge in our model, but national per capita products generally do not. If a lagging economy is unfamiliar with the leader, then the location of specialized-good production matters a great deal. A growing share of specialized-good production attracted to the leader reinforces its learning productivity advantage. And the world converges to a balanced growth equilibrium with a wide gap in living standards. On the other hand, when countries are broadly familiar with each other the location of specialized-good production matters little for learning productivity. Per capita products tend to converge because world scale exercises a more favorable effect on growth in the lagging than in the leading economy. In the limit, when familiarity is complete, so is the convergence of living standards.
Our notion of familiarity builds on the work of Luis A. Rivera-Batiz and Paul M. Romer (1991) , who emphasize the importance of the international flow of ideas for growth. They study the effect on growth rates of integrating two identical economies, however, while we explore the implications of familiarity for relative per capita products. Our model is also reminiscent of one in Robert Tamura (1991) , in which knowledge spillovers in the investment sector of an endogenous growth model cause incomes to converge. We, however, show how limited familiarity can account for incomplete convergence, and how familiarization of the lagging economy with the industrial leader makes overtaking possible.
The plan of the paper is as follows. World goods production is characterized in Section I. Section II motivates and describes the learning technology. World balanced growth is characterized in Section III. The model is employed in Section IV to interpret the history of industrial development. First, we use it to understand the divergence of national per capita products following the Industrial Revolution and the convergence among leading industrial economies thereafter. Then, we show why a large and persistent productivity gap can arise between a leading economy and a less-developed follower, and why it is so difficult to close. Finally, we analyze growth miracles -catching up and overtaking -by building on our analysis of the productivity gap.
Section V concludes with a brief summary of our results.
I. World Goods Production
The world contains two countries each of which produces an identical, nonstorable final good with two inputs: human-capital augmented (effective) labor and National labor forces are immobile, but trade in goods equalizes the cost of comparably skilled labor across countries. This means that the cross-country wage differential is proportional to the difference in national per capita human capital. Since effective labor is the only factor of production, national per capita final-good output equals the product of the world base (unskilled) wage, national human capital per capita, and national work effort per person. The common worldwide base wage rises with world scale, E, due to increasing returns to specialization in the manner of Romer (1987) .
We assume a small shipping cost so that intermediate-good firms choose to locate in the country with the greatest demand for intermediate goods.
1 Intermediategood firms will exist in both countries if and only if sales in each market are the same. (1)
where Equilibrium condition (1) says that a country's share of world specialized-good production depends positively on its share of world effective labor. The dependence works as follows. An increase in the share of world effective labor in one country relative to the other raises the relative marginal product of intermediate inputs in the former, and so raises relative demand there, too. Specialized-good producers react by moving to the larger market in sufficient number to eliminate the incipient inequality in market size, unless the larger economy already produces all the world's specialized inputs.
II. National Learning Technologies
Individuals can devote time to learning in order to accumulate human capital.
We identify three key elements that govern the productivity of the representative individual's learning time: own human capital, worldwide specialization, and familiarity with the foreign economy. We combine these in the following learning technology for the representative individual in Country i:
where e L is the fraction of time allocated to learning as opposed to working (e L ≡ 1 -e W ), h is per capita human capital, n is city population, and 0 < γ < 1. The functional form and exponent restrictions in (2) are chosen so that the model supports endogenous world balanced growth. From (2) the rate of growth of per capita human capital in Country i can be compactly expressed as:
where:
Using (1), (3), (A4), and the definition of S M , we can express the LP -learning
where, as noted above, S is Country A's share of the world effective supply of labor:
The parameter v i represents the number of cities in Country i, so that v i n i is national population.
As will be seen in Section IV, the essence of our model is embodied in expressions (5) and (6). In particular, the three arguments, v i , κ i , and S will be central to our characterization of balanced growth. They influence the respective national learning productivities as follows:
First, a parametric increase in the number of a country's cities v i raises its learning productivity through a national scale effect that raises the range of specialized goods available locally.
Second, as long as a country imports some specialized inputs, a parametric rise in its familiarity with the foreign economy (higher κ i ) raises its learning productivity due to a familiarity effect. with Country A, so that κ B < κ , the relocation effect dominates and a rise in S reduces Country B's learning productivity.
III. World Balanced Growth
Our goal in this section is to characterize world balanced growth equilibria in the model using the expressions for national learning productivity derived in Section II. In particular, we seek to determine the stationary value of Country A's share of world effective labor, S *, that supports world balanced growth. Assuming that the world is populated by infinitely-lived, utility-maximizing households, it is straightforward to show that the model economy converges to a balanced path along which effort allocations are constant and national per capita products grow at a common, constant rate.
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Since effort allocations are constant in balanced growth, and we take the number of cities v in a country as a fixed parameter, S is stationary if and only if h n grows at the same rate in the two countries. If we assume further that national population growth rates are the same, then the stationarity of S requires that per capita human capital grow at the same rate. Time allocated to learning depends positively and identically on the respective national learning productivity coefficients, LP i . Hence, according to (4), S* is the value that equates the national learning productivities, LP A and LP B .
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We characterize balanced growth diagrammatically because it is more convenient for our purposes than working with the analytical solution for S*. The balanced-growth equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1 for two countries sufficiently familiar with each other that both κ A and κ B exceed κ . The solid locus represents LP A and the dashed locus LP B . In the interior, where specialized inputs are produced in both countries, the loci are representations of (5) and (6) 
WORLD BALANCED GROWTH
The stationary value S* and the common learning productivity coefficient LP* are determined by the intersection of the learning productivity loci at point E in Figure   1 . The common balanced growth rate of national per capita products in the model is the sum of human capital growth and a term reflecting the scale effects of a growing world effective supply of labor. The latter term grows, in turn, with the sum of human capital and population growth. Hence, by differentiating (A5) in the appendix and substituting from (4) the balanced growth rate of per capita product can be expressed as:
where η is a common national population growth rate. Effort allocated to learning depends positively on learning productivity, so world per capita product growth varies directly with learning productivity.
14 Although growth rates converge in our model, national per capita products can vary widely along a balanced path. We shall see why this is the case below, when we use the model to interpret the history of industrial development in Section IV. However, we note here that the ratio of Country A's to Country B's per capita product in balanced growth can be expressed as:
Given the v i and n i that index relative national scale, expression (8) indicates that the ratio of the per capita product of Country A to Country B varies directly with Country A's share, S, of the world effective supply of labor. We use (8) extensively in the analysis that follows.
To illustrate the mechanics of the model, consider what would happen if the two countries became more familiar with each other, rotating the two LP curves in Figure 1 upward so as to keep S* unchanged. According to (8), relative per capita product would stay the same. Mutual familiarization, however, would increase LP* and raise the world growth rate by (7) as knowledge flowed more easily in both directions. If only one nation increased its familiarity with the other, world growth would still increase but, since S* would change in this case, the nation that increased its familiarity with the other would experience a relative rise in its living standard.
IV. Interpreting the History of Industrial Development
Prior to the Industrial Revolution, the variation in living standards around the world appears to have been due to differences in regional market size and proximity to international trade routes. In Europe, for instance, the fact that some regions were not well integrated with the rest -the Iberian peninsula and Eastern Europe -while others such as the Netherlands profited greatly from trade, meant that there could be substantial variation in incomes. For those portions of Europe linked by trade, however, the variation in living standards was probably smaller on the eve of the Industrial Revolution than it was to be for the next 150 years.
The potential profit from commerce encouraged an ongoing effort to reduce transport costs that steadily expanded trade in the centuries before the Industrial
Revolution [Daniel Boorstin (1983) , Carlo M. Cipolla (1985) ]. Along with the rising tide of commerce came rising living standards based on ever-greater specialization made possible by increasing market size. Goodfriend and McDermott (1995) argue that trade and population growth increased specialization and eventually raised learning productivity enough to initiate the self-sustaining technological progress that gives rise to modern industrial growth.
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A. The Divergence and Subsequent Convergence of National Per Capita Products
Our model provides a natural interpretation of the tendency for industrialization to cause national per capita products to diverge initially and to converge again over time. The interpretation flows from the fact that the model implies that two very different mechanisms determine equilibrium relative per capita products in the pre-industrial and post-industrial eras.
In terms of the model, we interpret the pre-industrial era as the period prior to In marked contrast, human capital accumulation is the engine of modern industrial growth in our model. The per capita product differential between two industrial economies is governed by forces pushing them toward balanced growth according to Figure 1 . In particular, relative national standing is determined by relative national learning productivities, which in turn depend on familiarity and national scale.
Other things the same, the country more familiar with its trading partner achieves higher per capita product; and the country with more cities ultimately does better. Our model suggests that industrialization caused national per capita products to diverge initially because of differences among nations in scale and familiarity with foreign economies.
Although familiarity is a parameter in our model, it is easy to see that familiarity The common learning productivity goes to LP max and according to (7) world growth reaches its maximum. Mutual familiarization also moves S* to v A / (v A + v B ) so that according to (8) per capita products converge absolutely if national city sizes (n i ) are equal. 17 To the extent that national scale is associated with number of cities rather than average city size, our model identifies in mutual familiarization a powerful force causing the per capita products of industrialized countries to converge over time.
B. The Great Productivity Gap
One of the most disturbing outcomes in the history of industrial development has been the emergence and persistence of a large gap in living standards between the leading industrial economies and less-developed countries (LDCs). Our model locates the problem in an LDC's extreme lack of familiarity with the leading economy due to such barriers as distance, language, and culture, or deliberate impediments to commercial intercourse.
18
To illustrate the point, suppose that Country B is so unfamiliar with Country A that κ B is less than κ ~ and Country B's learning productivity locus looks like KDLJ in Even though wages for comparably skilled workers are the same in the two countries, the typical worker in Country A has accumulated far more human capital in balanced growth than his counterpart in Country B. The differential in human capital per capita sustains the huge productivity gap that supports the large difference in living standards. Nevertheless, S* is large enough in balanced growth that the national learning productivity coefficients are the same and the two countries grow at the same rate.
The wide productivity gap develops because the lagging economy's lack of familiarity with the leader makes the relocation effect dominate the scale effect. The growing share of specialized goods production attracted to the leading country reinforces its initial learning productivity advantage. The leader grows faster, and the follower grows more slowly, until the leader has attracted all of the world's specializedgood production. 19 Thereafter, the relocation effect ceases to operate and the leader's learning productivity begins to fall toward its level in autarky. Simultaneously, the follower's learning productivity begins to rise as the lagging economy benefits increasingly from the growing relative size of the leader. National learning productivities converge gradually as the world asymptotically approaches balanced growth.
Our model suggests that an enormous productivity gap is hard to close because it inhibits the kind of commercial interaction that promotes familiarization. In the model, the LDC produces no specialized goods for export to the leader and imports very little. 20 Thus the model reproduces a pattern that has become well established and is likely to continue for some time: most developed and less-developed countries continue to grow at similar rates, but with staggering differences in income levels.
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C. Growth Miracles: Catching Up and Overtaking
History has recorded extraordinary examples of catching up and overtaking of per capita products of leading economies by less-developed countries. Much has been written about growth miracles in an effort to isolate the secret of their success. rising economy, the best the latter could do would be to achieve equality of per capita products at point G (again, assuming city sizes to be the same). States.
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The model predicts that anything building a "familiarity bridge" from less- 
V. Conclusion
We began by summarizing the diverse patterns of convergence, divergence, and overtaking that have characterized industrial development. Although such phenomena would appear to fit together awkwardly, we presented a model of endogenous growth capable of delivering the wide range of outcomes that we have observed.
We endowed two countries with identical goods-producing technologies and, through trade, gave each access to the full world range of specialized intermediate goods. Goods productivity differentials arose because of differences in national knowhow as indexed by per capita human capital. At the heart of our model was the idea that national learning productivities would differ depending on how well technical knowledge could be absorbed without the hands-on experience that comes with domestic production. Familiarity with the foreign economy raised a country's learning productivity by enabling it to better understand the design and manufacture of imported specialized goods. Learning productivity differentials did not lead to permanent growth differentials, however, but rather determined relative international standing in world balanced growth.
The major theme of our paper is that the efficiency with which knowledge can be acquired is a primary determinant of relative per capita products in the long run.
Countries that promote openness and familiarity with others find it easier to acquire Two countries, A and B, each produce an identical final good, Y, with the same technology. Output is generated by perfectly competitive firms within Country i (i = A, B) using the following production function: Each individual in Country i splits his total work effort e W i between final production and intermediate production:
The total demand for labor to produce intermediates must equal the available supply:
In equilibrium, each input is produced by a single monopolistic competitor in fixed supply x . Global specialization, M, is proportional to the world effective labor supply, E :
Per capita output of Country i is proportional to h and e W , and increases with E:
where
, and βE 1 -α is the common worldwide base wage, or the wage of a worker with one unit of human capital.
Intermediate good uses in the two countries are as follows:
where: inputs (S M = 0) and we have:
Footnotes
1 In general, both final-and intermediate-goods are traded, but since final-good firms produce a homogeneous good and are price takers, they are indifferent to location in equilibrium.
2 S M in (1) is found by equating (A6) and (A7) from the appendix.
3 De Long (1992) and Nathan Rosenberg (1976) present evidence that locally produced specialized goods used in production generate ideas for improving productivity more readily than less-wellunderstood imports.
4 See Romer (1986, example 3) , and Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1991, Chapter 8).
5 Cities within a country are entirely symmetric except that each produces a different subset of the range of the specialized goods produced nationally. Through trade each city acquires the full range of world specialized goods for use in final goods production. Our characterization of goods market equilibrium is unaffected by the distinction between extensive and intensive population.
6 See the related discussion in Lucas (1993) In terms of the underlying goods-producing technology described in the appendix, the constants are 14 The balanced-growth allocation of effort to learning is given by e L * = 1 -1 1 + γ γ + ρ -η LP * .
15 Equation (8) is easily derived using (A5) together with the definitions of E i and S . 16 The idea that trade assisted the growth of knowledge is an old one. It is found, for example in the work of David Landes (1969) and Walt W. Rostow (1975) . 17 To see that complete familiarity drives S* to v A / (v A + v B ), set κ A = κ B = 1 in (5) and (6), equate the two, and solve for S.
18 Parente and Prescott (1994) study the effect on relative living standards of deliberate barriers to technology adoption. 19 The force making for divergence in our model is reminiscent of that in Alwyn Young (1991) . In his model, trade creates a divergence in growth rates by shifting the composition of output in the follower to older industries for which learning by doing has been nearly exhausted, and does the reverse in the leader.
20 See (A6) and (A7), recognizing that x A and x B differ from each other in a corner where S M equals 0 or 1. 21 It is worth pointing out that multiple equilibria are possible in our model when mutual national familiarity is low enough. If Country A's familiarity with Country B were even lower than that shown in Figure 2 , the LP A locus could end up crossing the LP B locus three times. Another stable balanced growth equilibrium could exist to the left of point D and there would be an unstable balanced growth equilibrium in the interior. 22 For a recent example, see Lucas (1993) .
23 Point I could be higher or lower than J, so ultimately B's growth miracle could be either good or bad for world growth. 24 What we have in mind here, for example, is the idea that Japanese firms have become increasingly familiar with the chip-making techniques developed originally in the US. On the other hand, the US has been slower to learn about Japanese technology for making LCD screens. Thus, firms in the US that once had direct access to the latest technology, are now unable to access parts that are being developed in Japan. 25 The source of growth miracles remains controversial. Young (1995) , for instance, shows that much of Singapore's growth was due to rising labor force participation rates and physical capital, not technical change. 26 The beneficial effects of a familiarity bridge would be offset to the extent that familiarization gives rise to an out-migration of the sort commonly referred to as a brain drain.
